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FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE JAPANESE 
CAPITALISM AFTER THE WORLD WAR I 
By Y ASUZO HORIE 
PREFACE 
Japan, after the World War II, has been forced to feed an enormous 
population of over 80,000,000 in a small country with very scanty 
resources and impoverished production, due largely to her loss of 
natural resources in overseas territories and the great number of 
factorie3 burnt down. The only way in which Japan can support 
herself economically is to make progress as a trade nation of 
manufactured goods, and for that purpose it is necessary, first of 
all, to supply productive materials, and to improve the standards 
of technique which have fallen far behind the progress of the world 
during the War. It is a capital fund that comes first and foremost 
to fulfil those necessary conditions. Therefore the introduction of 
foreign capital was considered very urgent as soon as the War 
ended, and both the government and enterprisers have eagerly 
desired it. There are, however, certain political groups and others 
who have strongly opposed the introduction of foreign capital, saying 
that it will colonialize Japan or put Japanese labourers under its 
control. • 
This essay is to state one part of the history of the introduction of 
foreign capital into Japan, and hopes to be of some service in 
solving present problems concerning foreign capital. 
Japan had to introduce capital as well as technique from advanced 
countries, like many less advanced nations, so that Japan might 
quickly accomplish capitalistic development. While indeed in the 
first half of the Meiii Era (which ended in 1912) a policy to exclude 
foreign capital was adopted, after the Sino· Japanese War (1894·5), 
a plan was considered to hasten the introduction of it. It can be 
seen from the enforcement of gold standard (1897) and the establish· 
ment of the Industrial Bank of Japan (1900). And the government 
itself floated a foreign. loan, and some foreign capital flowed also 
jnto private enterprises in a form of joip.t-enterprise, 
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It was, however, very evident after the Russo-Japanese 'War 
(1904-5) that the introduction of foreign capital became very notable. 
The government not only found war expenditure and most of the 
expenses of postwar undertakings in foreign loans, but exchanged 
national loans of high rate of interest for foreign loans of low rate 
of interest, in order to fill up private capital which had been spent 
as war expenditure. At the same time, foreign capital flowed directly 
into private enterprises to a great degree. That the Tokyo Electric 
Company and the Shibaura Seisakusho (Electric Works) got the General 
Electric Co. (U. S. A.) as their principal stock-holders, and that 
Armstrong and Vickers Cos. (Britain) together with the Hokkaido 
.Tanko Kisen Co. (Colliery & Shipping Co.), of Mitsui capital, 
established Nippon Seikosho (Steel Mill) with their joint account, 
were all most conspicuous instances of foreign capital which flowed 
into japan. In these instances,' together with capital, technique of 
a high standard was introduced, and that of japanese industry 
was greatly raised. Truely, the development of japanese capitalism 
after the Russo-japanese War owed not a little to foreign capital. 
The de'ail of the problem in question will be dealt with on 
other occa~ions, but here in this paper the relation between foreign 
capital and japanese capitalism in the next period, that is, after the 
World War I, is to be eXClmined. 
1. BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR I 
While balance of trade, when summed up through nine years 
between 1905, when the Russo-Japanese War ended, and 1914, when 
the World War I began, went up to 524 million yen,an excess of 
imports over exports, balance of trade in gold and silver, during 
the same period, showed an excess of an inflow of over 44 million 
yen. The reason why there was an excess of an inflow of gold and 
silver, even when such an eaormous amount of an excess of import~ 
over exports was paid, was due chiefly to the import of foreign 
capital. The import of foreign capital as national and . municipal 
loans and debentures rapidly increased from 421 million yen in 1904 
to 1,414 million yen in 1905, and then gradually increased to 1,979 
.million yen or almost to 2,000 million yen at the end of 1914. 
Considering the period between the Sino-Japanese War and the 
Russo-japanese War as the first stage of the development of japanese 
capitalism, the one iJetween the R~sso-Japanese War and the WQrl~ 
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War I was the second stage. In thi> period, not only light .industries 
but also heavy industries were mechanized and carried on a large 
scale. Accordingly, in foreign trade, the relative position of 
finished manufactures stayed fixed, occupying about 30 % of exports, 
while it was rapidly falling from 28% to 14% of imports. What 
made the relative position of finished manufactures fall in imports 
was the increase in the import of crude. materials. Considered 
from this fact, Japan after the Russo-japanese War can be s3id 
to have been establishing a foundation as a nation of manufactured 
goods. Such a development, moreover, was kept up by foreign capital 
above stated, and it was due not a little to foreign capital that gold 
standard which played a part in the development could be sustained. 
The tendency of an excegs of imports over exports in foreign 
trade of merchandise became excessive year after year, and the 
balance of an outflow and inflow of gold and silver after 1910 
showed succesive excess of outflow. This turned out to be a 
business depression in economic activities. The depression which 
followed a postwar reactionary panic of 1907 became chronic, and 
in 1913 runs on banks, suspensions of payment and failures of 
commercial and industrial firms were so frequent that it was felt 
doubtful to sustain gold standard. Thus, when the World War I 
broke out in 1914, a panic started as a result of blows on foreign 
trade which followed the outbreak, and financial circles exposed 
their great distress. 
As stated above, japanese capitalism entered the second stage of 
its development after the RUSSO-japanese War, but the foundation 
was very fragile. It was chiefly because the development was made 
by the inflow of foreign capital, especially in the form of loans. 
japan was a debtor nation then, and in 1914, as credits, Japan had 
specie reserve of 130 million yen in the Bank of Japan, specie abroad 
of 220 million yen, and investment of 460 million yen overseas, in 
all 810 million yen, while she had debts of over 1,900 million yen of 
national and local loans and debentures, that is, debts excess of 
1,100 million yen. With these debts, an excess of imports over exports 
continued. There lay the root of financial anxiety, and if things 
had gone on as they were, Japan would not have escaped business 
failures. And it was the World War I that swept the anxiety away. 
At the time of the War, export trade made rapid development. 
As Japan was a trade nation of manufactured goods, import trade 
became large too, but it did not come up to export trade in amount 
the previous eighteen months. Thus in four years, 1915-1919, there 
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was a huge excess of exports, which amounted to 1,408 million yen 
in all. Besides, credit account in invisible trade increased so much 
that the amount of excess amounted to 1,340 million yen in the four 
years, and even after 1919 when visible trade changed to an excess 
of imports, excess of receipts in invisible trade had continued for 
some years. Thus, the excess of receipts in five years, 1915·1919. 
amounted to 3,107 million yen in all (1,'214 million yen in visible 
trade, 1,893 million yen in invisible trade). On account of such an 
enormous ;excess of credit account in so short a period, foreign 
exchange banks lost their purchasing power of foreign exchange 
. bills, on the one hand, and there could not be found proper 
means to deal with the excess, on the other. Indeed, there appeared 
such a strange effect on Japanese economy which fell into difficulties 
because of the enormous excess of credit account. 
The difficulties, however, were settled by the coming of peace . 
. As the straitened circumstances of Japanese international finance wefj:~ 
settled by the outbreak of the World War, so were settled the 
straitened circumstances of international finance in another sense by 
the suspension of hostilities. Thus, one might say that Japan was 
lucky twice. The excess of receipts above mentioned was cleared 
as shown in the following table: 
Increase of gold held abroad I Yl,130 million 
Governmen t loans of Allied Powers 
\ 
144 purchased by Japanese citizen 
Yen loans of Allied Powers subscribed I 438 
British Treasury-Notes accepted 
I 100 by the Japanese Government 
Loans to Chinese Government I 220 
Redemption of Japanese Government 
\ 
213 foreign currency bonds 
Redemption of. municipal loans and 
I 38 debentures of foreign currency 
Repurchase of National Loans floated 
I 62 in the country and abroad 
Excess of import of gold and silver I 518 
Others I 244 
Total I 3,107 
0" •• . - _ .. 
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Idle capital made at home was exported to subscribe to Russian, 
. Chinese, British and French loans and debentures, and overseas 
capital was invested in foreign securities. Accordingly, Japan turned 
out to be a creditor nation after all through the W orId War 1. In 
short, the credit account in 1920 consisted of the gold reserve of 
1,110 million yen of the Bank of Japan, gold held abroad of 1,060 
million yen, and overseas investment of 2,200 miIlion yen - in all, 
4,370 miIlion yen compared with debit account amounting to 1,650 
miIlion yen for loans and debentures, the balance being an excess 
credit account of 2,720 million yen. Furthermore, loans and debentures 
issued at home during and after the war, which amounted to a vast 
amount of 3,700 million yen in all, were almost consumed there. 
Under such conditions the import of foreign capital was doubtless 
out of the question, and from the outbreak of the War to 1922, the 
amount of foreign capital invested in Japan was decreasing year by 
year. Here is a table to show outstanding foreign investments in 
Japan. (unit: 1 thousand yen) 
National National Loans Local Deben· Direct Investrnents 
Loans (home issued) loans tures by Forejgners in 
year (issued sold to (issued (issued Japanese Banks Total 
abroad) Foreigners abroad) abroad) & Companies 
(estimated) (estimated) 
1915 1,493,156 71,832 176,894 166,540 28,102 1,936,524 
1916 1,184,853 56,174 175,106 166,189 2,,697 1,809,019 
1917 1,348,587 40,999 172.534 166,049 26,275 1,754,444 
1918 1,311,138 31,627 168,5.25 165,526 27,352 1,704,168 
1919 1,311,138 63,185 147,318 165,285 25;046 1,721,971 
1920 1,428,293 34,308 140,290 47,541 30,507 1,680,000 
1921 1,362,370 18,483 135,970 33,358 25,416 1,576,597 
1922 1,358,973 5,676 134,219 26,400 24,831 1,550,093 
The vast amount accumulated during the War, however, was 
lost soon. By the armistice, difficulties of Japanese international 
finance were settled for a time, but with the loss of the 
accumulation, Japanese economy was driven to return to its poor 
condition in which Japan was before the War. The chief cause of it 
was a huge excess of imports. 
It was not that exports suddenly decreased when hostiIi'ies were 
suspended, but that imports increased so greatly that there arose 
again an excess of the latter over the former. The excess of 
imports was so large in the autumn of 1919, that it was twice or 
three times as much each month as in normal times, and that 
consequently in the three months from January to March, in 
1~20, an exceS3 of imports amounted at last to 300 miIlion yen in all. 
" ., 
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The panic in March of the year resulted chiefly from the 
extraordinary excess of imports, the immediate cause of the panic 
being a sudden contraction of currency, which was led by a rapid 
decrease of specie abroad. With the panic as a turning point,prosperity 
turned into a business depression, and resulted also in trade de pres· 
eion. And yet the excess of imports still continued, its cause being 
that the depression after the War spread all over the world and the 
purchasing power for Japanese goods decreased, that price level 
was still higher at home compared with other countries, and conse-
quently the Japanese people rather demanded foreign goods. Thus 
Japanese finance after the armistice was very insecure. 
Though the panic of 1920 demanded a thorough readjustment in 
financial circles, it was neglected relying upon scanty capital abroad. 
Disturbances were sure to come at any moment. . The great earth-
quake-fire occurred in the Kanto District in September, 1923. It 
caused vast loss of wealth amounting to over 10,000 million yen, and 
made it indispensable to import materials urgently required for 
restoration. Thus an excess of imports in trade amounted to 534 
million yen in 1923, and to 646 million yen in 1924, and it not only 
consumed all the scanty capital abroad then, but it made it 
necessary to remit gold reserves abroad. 
II. IMPORT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL (LOANS AND DEBENTURES) 
CAl National and Local Loans 
Under these circumstances the import of foreign capital which 
had ceased after ·the outbreak of the War was resumed. Let us 
begin with national loans. 
As expenses required for repair work after the great earthquake-
~re were enormous, and required immediate payment, the government 
planned to raise a loan of about 1,500 million yen. As it was a time 
when damages done in a reactionary period after the World War 
were not yet cleared, it was quite impossible to think that the Japanese 
financial circles were capable of absorbing such an immese loan. 
And when relations with other countries were considered, the term 
of redemption of the Government 4 % % Sterling Loan, . First 
and Second Series - Russo- Japanese War Loans - that is, 1925 
was drawing near. Moreover, repair materials had to be partly 
obtained abroad, for the payment of which it was necessary for the 
government to have a considerable amount of specie prepared 
<l,broad. Accordingly, the government, besides a domestic loan, raised 
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foreign loans in London and New York in February of 1924. They 
were the 6% Sterling Loan amounting to £ 25 million (244.075 
million yen) and the 6 Y2 % Dollar Loan amounting to $ 150,000,000 
(300.9 million yen). As both of them were put together with the 4 % % 
Sterling Loan above mentioned, and issued in the form of composite 
loans, consequently most of the proceeds of the Loans were, with a 
view to being used to retire the outstanding balance of the 4 1",:) % 
Sterling Loan, transferred to the special account for the consolidation 
of national debt funds. After all, the amount issued according to 
Sinsai ·,zengo . Kosai . Ho (the Loan Act to Cope with the Earthquake) 
was 116,501,069 yen in all (dollar loan, 11,430,785 yen, sterling loan, 
105,070,284 yen). 
There were a number of things worth attention about these loans. 
( 1) The conditions of the issuance of the loans were so unfavourable 
to Japan that they were called "loans of humiliation," owing to the 
sudden changes of European and American financial worlds after 
the Great War, general rise of interest, decline of Japanese credit 
overseas on account of the earthquake· fire and political anxiety 
both here and abroad. 
( 2) When Japan planned to raise loans, she began to negotiate 
with English financiers, but England had noticed the lack of her own 
capital, and London had already ceased to be a free market to issue 
loans. Consequently Japan had to begin to negotiate with London 
and New York financiers about the issuance side by side, and she 
came to obtain a supply of foreign capital more in America than in 
England ever after . 
. ( 3) When the loans were raised, most powerful syndicates were 
organized in England and America. In America, besides Kuhn·Loeb 
& Co., which had been exclusively underwriting Japanese foreign 
loans from the time of the Russo·Japanese War, J. P. Morgan & Co., 
National City & Co., and the First National Bank of the City of 
New York - those three were newly joined as managing banks, 
under which there was organized a body of sub· contract banks, 
including many influential financiers. In England, in addition to 
Westminster Bank (formerly Parrs Bank), Honkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation, Panmure Gordon & Co;, the former body of 
loan contract banks, newly joined N. M. Rothschild & Sons, Baring 
Brothers & Co., and J. H. Schroder & Co., and for the purpose of 
connecting both bodies of English and American banks, Morgan 
Grenfell & Co. (London), relative of the Morgans of America, was 
added as a member, This serves to show that the financial relG\tions 
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between Europe, America and Japan became much closer than before; 
Three municipal foreign loans were iS5ued by the Industrial 
Bank of Japan to raise expenses for the earthquake -fire restoration: 
Tokyo City Restoration Loan and Yokohama City Restoration Loan. 
They were as follows: 
I R I Date of Issuer ate Issue Maturity Amount I issued Remarks 
City of 5\£0 1926 1961 6,000,000 Sterling Loan, offered to Tokyo London financier group. 
City of Doll ar Loan, offered to Yoko- 6 1926 1960 19,740,000 New york financier group. hama 
City of 5% 1927 1961 20,640,000 Dollar Loan, offered to Tokyo New York financier group. 
The national government hitherto maintained strict control over 
the issuance of local foreign loans by a note sent to local governors 
in 1909. The government warned that a local public body had to get 
the permission of Home and Finance Ministers before it could begin 
negotiations, when it wanted to raise a foreign loan, and that the 
government might not give approval when it asked for it after it had 
begun negotiations, under whatever circumstnces_ Sinco the outbreak 
of the World War, financial circles became active, and there was no 
longer any issuance of lo::al foreign loans. In the reactionary period 
after the War, moreover, the government encouraged readjustment 
and retrenchment of local financial affairs as much as possible, and 
it strictly adhered to its policy not to permit the raising of local foreign 
loans. Thus the two cities for the first time in fifteen years since 
1912 were permitted to raise foreign loans. How hard was the 
blow given by the earthquake-fire can be seen from this fact. 
Later in 1930 the government raised the following two loans: 
5 % % Sterling Loan amounting to £ 12.5 million (122.037 million yen) 
in London, and 5 % % Dollar Loan amounting to $ 71 million (142. 
426 million yen) in New York. These loans were used for converting 
the 4 % Sterling Loan (Second Series) of 1905, whose term of 
redemption was to come in January of 1931. 
( B) Debentures 
According to the Financial and Economic Annual 0/ Japan 
(compiled by the Ministry of Finance), at the end of 1913, debentures 
issued abroad amounting to 166,880 million yen which were 
gradually decreasing a little, suddenly decreased to 47.5 million yen 
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in 1920, and to 26.4 million yen in 1922. But it increased to 133 
million yen in the following year, and then rapidly increased to 
506 million yen by the end of 1931, which was 9.7 per cent of the 
total sum of debentures of banks and companies. The reasons for 
the increase of the overseas sUbscription of debentures were (1) 
when all the wartime accumulation had been consumed as stated 
above, and capital had relatively run short, the outbreak of the 
great earthquake - fire made it difficult to supply long term 
capital at home, (2) the government tried to fill shortage of gold 
held abroad by private debentures, (3) considered from abroad, 
the government controlled subscriptioll3 of national and local foreign 
loans as much as possible, so that there was left some room for 
the sub3cription of debentures, (4) credit for Japanese private enter-
pri3es increased, (5) every nation had recovered the gold standard, 
with the result that international movement of capital was made 
comparatively easy_ 
Now, let us explain the nature of foreign loans issued by private 
companies. 





Issue issued or Houses 
Oriental Development Co. 1923 $19,900,000 National City & Co. 
South Manchurian 1923 £4,000,000 Industrial Bank of Japan. Railway Co. 
Industrial Bank of Japan 1n4 $2.3,000,000 National City & Co. 
Oriental Development Co. 1923 $19,900,000 National City & Co. 
Formosan Electric Co. 1931 $.Z2,800,000 National City, First 
National, and Yokohama 
Specie Bank. 
Among five kinds of loan put tip above, Industrial Bank Bill 
was issued for the purpose of obtaining funds to be le;}t to the 
Chinese government; other four loans were issued with a view to 
obtain development funds of the so-called Japanese Overseas Empire. 
In short, a part of Japanese overseas development funds was 
supplied with foreign capital, and thi3 was a tendency which had 
already appeared before the World War. The things worthy of 
special note during the postwar period were the issuance of 
electricity development loans by the Japanese big five electric com-
panies, which were already controlling the electric business circles. 
The loans were as follows; 
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Amount 
Issuer Date of Maturity Description issued Offering House issue (unit = or Houses 
1 thousand) 
!:Ie Tokyo Electric 1923 1948 Old 1st £, 3,000 Whitehall Trust Light Co. Debenture (29,289) 
Daido Electric 1924 1930 1st $ 15,000 Dillon Read Power Co. (SO,090) 
!:Ie Tokyo Electric 1925 1948 Old 2nd £, 600 Whitehall Trust Light Co. (5,857) 
Toho Electric 1925 1955 1st $ 15,000 GuaranteeTrust Power Co. (30,090) 
Ujigawa 1925 1945 $ 14,000 Lee Higginson Electric Co. (28,08!) 
Daido Electric 1925 1950 2nd $ 16,500 Dillon Read Power Co. (27,081) 
Toho Electric 300 Prudential 
Power Co. 1925 1945 . £, (2,929) Assurance Co. 
I:>. Tokyo Electric 1925 1928 Old $ 24,000 Guarantee Trust Light Co. (48,144) 
Tokyo Electric Shinetsu 1927 1952 Electric 7,650 Light Co. Co.'s $ (15,346) Dillon Read 
Debenture 
Nippon Electric 1928 1953 $ 9,000 Harris Forbes Power Co. (18,054) 
" 
Tokyo Electric 1928 1953 $ 70,000 Guarantee Trust Light Co. (140,420) 
" Tokyo Electric 1928 1953 £, 4,500 Whitehall Trust, Light Co. (42,933) Lazard Brothers 
I:>. Toho Electric 1929 1932 2nd $ 11,450 Guarantee T~ust Power Co. (22,968) 
Nippon Electric 1931 1953 £, 1,500 Harris Forbes Power Co. (14,645) 
Remarks: !:Ie show the loans refunded in the year 1929, and c, in their 
maturities. X are their conversion loans. Parenthesized 
numbers indicate the sums, which were converted into yen 
on ·the basis of the mint par of those days. 
Various circumstances can be mentioned to explain why electric 
company debentures came to occupy an overwhelming position among 
foreign ones, 
0) As the resu:t of the earthquake·fire, electric enterprises 
were given many chances of making very rapid development. Ac, a· 
matter of fact, even during the World War, demand for industrial 
electric power was increasing, and thi:; was getting still greater after 
the War. St~am power, on the other hand, still occupied a strong 
position, and it was difficult then to convert them into electric power 
at once, when the matter of refunding equipment was considered. 
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However, a'3 they were destroyed- by the earthquake·fire, the use of 
electric power machine's rapidly spread. Consequently, electric 
power enterprises not only recovered rapidly from the blows added 
by the earthquake·fire, but got a chance to expand their business. 
Under such circumstances, electric companies expanded so gre'atly 
that their prohcted capital of 2,175 million yen in 1922, increased to 
over 3,000 miIlbn yen in 1925, and came to rank first, surpassing 
'projected capital of banking, railway and truck business. This rapid 
expansion made it partly necessary t~ depend on foreign capital. 
Let us quote a passage) from the Tokyo Dento Kaigyo 50·nenshi 
(50 years History of the Tokyo Electric Light Co.): "The five elec· 
tric companies, with our company at the top, showed unusual 
expansion as stated abov~, and so they were naturally compelled to 
exp=nd a vast amount for constructio:1 works. The appropriation 
of funds was due not only to stock capital in general or home 
dedentures, but served to raise lower interest loans on English and 
American markets, as lluggested by the government, and came to 
develop new fields of import of foreign capital. " 
( 2) . An electric enterprise needs vast fixed equipment whose 
term of redemption is long, and at the stage of its rapid development, 
as above mentioned, its owned capital was not enough. Here is a. 
table to show how it was organized: (unit: 1 million yen) 
year I Capital I Paid·up Capital I F' d C· I Debentutes & Ixe apltal Floating Debts I Reserve .. 
1924 2,616 2,012 2,467 760 98 
1931 4,143 3,223 4,755 2,472 196 
The ratio of paid· up capital plus reserve to fixed capital was 
116.9 % in 1924, and 138.6 % in 1931; the ratio of debentures and 
floating debts to paid· up capital was 22.8 % and 76.4 % res;Jectively. 
It was during 1924 and 1931 that a sev:re struggle among 'the five 
electric companies' for supremacy was develop=d, with financial 
capital and political parties in the background. In the course of the 
struggle, such· a vast amount of outside capital as mentioned above 
was u'3ed to supply heavy expenses for both generating and tranS. 
mitting equipment of electricity and foreign loans of long term and 
of low rate of interest were warmly welcomed. Let us examine here 
why Ujigawa Electric Co. raised a foreign loan in 1925. The company 
had had debentures amounting to 55 million yen then, and the term 
of redemption of 35 million yen out of the amount was .drawing near, 
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but home dedentures whose rate of interest was high and· whose 
term was usualJy ten or twelve years, made its management quite 
impossible, and it had to resort to a foreign loan. 
Thus foreign loans occupied a large part in outside capital of elec· 
tric companies, especiallY of the five leading companies. When all the 
foreign deb::mtures of electric power companies standing at the end 
of 1931 were put together, there were $ 149,545, 000 and £ 6,300;000, 
that is, 362.5 million yen in all at par of exchange, about 15 % of the 
total of all the debentures and floating debts above mentioned. 
Viewed from another point of view, the amount was 70 % of the 
total of alJ the foreign currency debentures of Japan at that time, 
or 16.5 % of all the foreign currency bonds including national and 
municipal loans. 
The amount of interest payment and of stipulated redemption of 
the debentures became larger year after year, and especially when 
the exchange rate got low, as a result of the embargo on the expor-
tation of gold in 1931, the burden was twice or thrice heavier and was 
regarded as a curse upon business management. It was widely 
known that the alleviation of the burden by the re-purchase of a part 
of the debentures was attempted in 1933 and 1934 wi'h the permission· 
of the government. Be that as it may, it was' a matter of great 
significance that an enormous amount of foreign loa~s contributed to 
the expansion of our electric enterprise. 
III. IMPORT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL (DIRECT INVESTMENT) 
Let us quote. first some descriptions upon direct investment by 
Americans in Japan from the "American Foreign Investment" (pp. 
106-5), by R. W. Dunn. 
"The General Electric Co. has combined its Japanese husiness with 
that of the Shibaura Electric Works, and the Westinghouse Electric 
Co. of Japan distributes directly the products of the Westinghouse 
Electric and Manufacturing Co. The W (stern Electric Co. has COIn-
bined with the Nippon Dento Electric Works; and the· Tokyo 
Electric Co., after absorbing 9 competing firms in 1923, concluded a 
combination with the Western Electric Co. Most of these electric 
companies are actively engaged in electrical goods manufacture, 
construction of power plants and lines, as well as imports and sales . 
... ...... ---The American International Corporation together with the 
Allied Machinery Co. of Americ3. controls Horne Co., Ltd., of Japan 
(machines and tools), which includes among other plants the Yawata 
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Iron Works of Japan. The Ford Motor CO. IS operating a new 
plant at Yokohama. 
Americans are interested a'so in flour mills and in general bank,' 
ing and trading. Some of the best known firms with prop8rty 
investments are Asia Banking Corporation, the Radio Corporation of 
America, American Trading Co., International Banking Corporation 
(four branches), Libby·Owens Sheet Gl2ss Co. (subsidiary and plant), 
International Oil (Standard Oil subsidiary), Rob8rt Dollar Co., the 
Aluminum Co. of America, owning 60 per cent of the shares of the 
Asi 1 Aluminum Co., and various steamship, express, film, life 
insurance and commercial companies." 
Among the various enterprises describ~d here, there were not 
a few in which capital was invested before the World War, and 
some in which investment was begun after the War, tOJ. With the 
War, it was very noteworthy that foreign commercial c:mcerns fell 
back, while such Japanese trading concerns as Mitsui BU1san Kaisha 
and Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha became influential. Nevertheless direct 
investments by foreigners in Japanese manufacturing industries 
became rather popular. Indeed, even during the War and after, in 
which foreign loans were never raised, the direct investments 
were continued. According to an investigation by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, the following were foreign hdustrial 
companies and foreign investing companies in January, 1931. 
(1) Foreign companies 
American·· .. ·· .. · 15 companies (oil ...... 1; electric instruments .. · .. · 
1; machinery ...... 9; movies .. · .. · 2; confectionery ...... 1; raw silk 
....... 1) 
English .. · ...... 5 companies (electric instruments ...... 1: machinery 
...... 2; paints ...... 1; drinks· .... · 1) 
German ......... 5 companies (electric instruments ...... 1; machinery 
...... 4) 
Swiss ......... 2 companies (machinery ...... 1; confectionery .. · .. · 1) 
Czechoslovak and Luxembourg ......... 1 company each (machinery 
...... 1 each) 
(2) Semi·foreign companies 
CA) All the capital invested, and management carried out, by forei-
gners. 
American· ...... 6 companies (electric instruments...... 2; automo· 
bile ...... 2; machinery .. · .. · 1 ; record ...... 1) authorized capital .. · .. 
about yen 18,000,000 
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English _ .. _ ..... 5 companies (rubber .... ·· 1; oil······ 1; machinery 
...... 1; drinks ...... 1; medicine··· .. -1) authorized capital··.... a bout 
yen 36,450,000 
German ......... 2 companies (drinks ...... 1; dry plate ...... 1) author-
ized capital··· ... about yen 520,000 
(E) Joint investinent, but more than half of it and management by 
foreigners 
American ....... ,. 6 companies (record .. · .. , 5; rubber ...... 1) paid·up 
capital ...... yen 22,050,000; investment by foreigners ...... yen 
15,995,000 
English ......... 2 Gompanies (automobile ...... 1; machinery ...... 1) 
paid-up capital··· .. - 2,550,000; investment by foreigners ...... about 
yen 2,000,000 
German ............ 2 companies (machinery ......... 2) investment by 
foreigners· .. ··· yen 338,000 
(C) Joint investment, but management by the Iapanese 
American· .... · ... 9 companies (electric instruments ...... 6; gas ., ... 1 ; 
glass .. , ... 1; artificial silk ...... 1) paid-up capital· .. ··· yen 
100,700,000: investment by foreigners", ... yen 21,595,000 
English .. " .. ······9 companies (steel······ 2; iron goods ...... 1; 
cotton yarn .... ,. 3; knit goods ..... 1; ice manufacture ...... 1; 
celluloid ...... 1): paid-up capital··· ..... , yen 88,600,000; investment 
by foreigners ...... yen 9,377,000 
Germa'n ......... 8 companies (electric~instruments ...... 2; machinery 
...... 1; artificial silk ...... 2; cotton yarn ...... 2; woollen yarn 
.. : .. ·1) : paid-up capital .... " yen 29,285,000; investment by foreigners 
...... yen 9,377,000 
Chinese ......... 2 companies (woollen yarn .. · .. · 1; cotton yarn .... .. 
1) paid-Up capital ...... yen 41,000,000; investment by foreigners .... .. 
yen 158,000 
Swedish .. -...... 1 company (match ...... 1) 
French ........ ·1 company (chemicals ...... I) 
Unknown ......... 6 companies; paid-up capital...... yen 30,760,000; 
investment by foreigners ...... yen 364,000 
Ey foreign companies mentioned in the table are meant those which 
have their branches in Japan. These branches were perhaps merely 
dealing in goods made by head companies. (a) of semi·foreign com-
panies are those established in accordance with Japanese commercial 
.law as a matter of form, but all the capital is invested by foreign-
ers. The purely English . Dunlop Rubber Co., which was changed 
into a Japanese company in 1917, Rising Sun Co" Japan Ford Co" 
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Japan General Motors Co., Japan Victor Co., and Japan Columbia 
Co. were those best known. (b) and (c) of semi·foreign companies 
undoubtedly are those in which foreign capital is invested in company 
with Japanese capital, that is, a joint enterprise. 
Among those companies the following were those about which it 
was comparatively clear how investment was made. 
To begin with, in the electric instrument manufacturing section 
in which foreign capital bad already been invested before the World 
War in a form of joint enterprise, for example, Japan Electric 
Co., Tokyo Electric Co. and Shibaura Seisakusho (Electric Works), 
foreign capital was introduced continuou3ly after the World War. 
First among them was Mitsubishi Electric Instrument Co. The 
Company, which became independent from the Kobe Dockyard of 
Mitsubishi Ship-building Co. in 1921, joined hands with Westinghouse· 
International Electric Co., U. S. A., tecbnically and financiallY, and 
then became a sole agency in Japan of the goods made by the 
company in November, 1929, and newly established His~jmi Electric 
Instrument Concern as a sole agent in January, 1931. The second 
was the Fuji Electric Instrument Co. It was founded in August, 
1923 with a capital of 10 million yen as a joint enterprise of 
Furukawa capital and of two German companies, Siemens Schuckert 
and Siemens Halske. First it devoted itself to importation, but in 
1925 Kawasaki Factory being completed, it began to make electric 
instruments using German technique. In 1939 it established Fuji 
Telegraphic Instrument Manufacturing Co. with a capital of 6 mil-
lion yen, its telephone works being separated; and in 1923 the two. 
companies jointly established Fuji Telegraphic Instrument Works in 
Mukden with a capital of one million yen. The 3rd was Shibaura 
Joint Industry Co., established in 1939 jointly by Shibaura Electric 
Works and United Engineering and Foundry Co., U. S. A., and 
began to make pressing and compressing instruments. And it was 
in the same year that Shibaura Electric Works and Tokyo Electric 
Co.,. sister companies through General Electric Co., were merged 
into the Tokyo-Shibaura Electric Instruments· Manufacturing Co. 
Sumitimo Electric Cable Factory which got American capital 
can be mentioned, when industry concerning electric instruments 
manufacturing is considered. It became independent of Sumitomo 
Copper Works in 1911, and was separated from Sumitomo head 
office in 1920, when it joined hands with Western Electric Co., U. S. 
A., and became a ioint-stock company with a capital of 10 million 
yen. It wep.t hand ip. hand technically with Westerp. Electric Co., and 
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Standard Telephone Cable Co., England, and made its own researches, 
thus, occupying the highest position in Japan in the manufacture of 
cables and hawsers. In 1932 it established a submarine cable 
manufacturing factory in Osaka, and succeeded in making ·G. P. 
submarine 'cables domestic products. The factory and the submarine 
cable branch of Furukawa Electric Works were separated from each 
head office, and joined into a company - Japan Submarine Cable 
Manufacturing Co. 
Next to be mentioned is the entry of the American automobile 
capital some years around 1926, when motor transportation rapidly 
increased in Japan. It was the Kanto Earthquake·fire that spurred 
on this development. Before this time, there was little use for 
automobiles except for personal use, auto·buses and taxicabs. With 
the earthquake-fire as its turning point, the use of auto-buses 
rapidly expanded, and truck transport business appeared as part of 
the automobile industry, and there was a demand for cars for 
various uses. Consequently Japan became very promising as a 
market for automobiles. It was Ford Motor Co. which turned its 
attention to this condition. The company which had made Sale 
Frazer & Co. a sale agency in Japan, founded Japan Ford Motor Co. 
with a capital of 4 miJIion yen in December, 1924, established a 
factory in Yokohama and began operation by conveyer assembling 
system from March, 1925. 
In 1925 General Motors Co., rival to Ford, established Japan 
General Mo:ors Co. in Osaka with a capital of 8 million yen and 
in April, 1927 began operation of an assembiing factory: When it 
was going to be established, Osaka City offered the company very 
favourable conditions such as exemption from city tax for four years, 
and facilities for the establishment of the plant. 
Together with rapid development of motor. transportation, and 
with the spread of internal combustion engines for agricultural and 
fishing purposes, demand for petroleum increased year after year. 
That is, while the quantily of demand was about 104 million gallons 
before the War, it increased rapidly after the War, and reached 
741 million gallons in 1934. But, because of our poor resources, the 
ratio of home petroleum production to the amount demanded was 
getting very small, that is. 34.2 % in 1923. 8.4 % in 1934, so that 
for the petroleum industry in Japan it was rather important to engage 
in refining imported crude oil. 
In 1921, Asab i Oil Co. started this industry first, and so did 
Japan Oil and Kokura Oil from 1924, and they all established oil 
54 Y. HORIE 
refineries on a large scale. On their heels appeared Mitsubishi Oil 
(1931), Maruzen Oil (1933), Hayayama Oil (1935), and many other 
foreign oil refining companies. Among them, it was Mitsubishi Oil 
Co. that joined hands with foreign capital. It established an oil 
refinery in Kawasaki with a joint capital of 7 million yen with 
United Oil Co. of Canada. 
Although developed thus the oil refining industry, the output in 
Japan was only 40 % of the amount demanded; and remaining 60 % 
had to be imported as finished goods. It was two Japanese compa-
nies of two great English and American oil trusts - Rising Sun Oil 
Co. and Japan Vacuum Oil Co. - that chieflY supplied the demand. 
In addition to the three sections mentioned above, there were 
many enterprises in which foreign capital was invested. 
( I) Japan Plate·Glass Co. (first called Japan·American Plate-Glass 
Co.) was established in 1918 as a joint American and Japanese 
enterprise .. It was due to the cooperation of Libby-Owens Sheet 
Glass Co. and Sumitomo & Co., Ltd ., and undoubtedly a big sheet 
g,Iass maker in Japan next to Asahi Glass Co. of Mitsubishi clpitai. 
(2) Asahi Bemberg Silk-thread Co. (established as Nobeoka 
Ammonia Silk·thread Co. in 1922) was a joint enterprise '.';ith German 
capital, principal German shareholders being Allgemeine Kunstseide, 
1. G. Farbenindustrie, P. Bemberg, and SJ on. 
( 3) In 1927 Japan Victor Gramophone Co. was established with 
American capital and in 1929 it became a j)int enterprise of Americans 
and Japanese with capital of the two plutocracies, Mitsubishi and 
Sumitomo. Together with this, in 1927 Japan Gramophone Co. 
(established in 1910 with American capital) joined hands with 
Columbia Co. (England) technically and financially, and established 
Japan Columbia Gramophone Co., a collateral company, in the follow-
ing year. Japan Victor Co. and Japan Gramophone Co. became 
independent from foreign capital and entered Japan Industrial Co. 
in 1937 and 1935 respectively. But when the company moved t) 
Manchuria in 1937, the management of bJth gramophone companies 
was entrusted to Tokyo Electric Co. 
( 4) In 1931 the aluminium pla'e industry of Sumitomo Copper 
Works was separated, and Sumitomo Aluminium Co. was established 
with a capital of 3.5 million yen. It was a joint enterprise of Sumitomo 
Meta! Co. and Aluminium Co. of Canada, and one which led the 
aluminium industry in Japan. (5) In 1932 Otis Elevator Co., U. S. A., 
established Oriental Otis Elevator Co. in cooperation with Mi!sui-
buss<Jn Co, 
FOREIGN CAPlTA.L AND THE JAPANESE CAPITAUsM 55 
In addition to these, there were Oriental Babcock Co. (Babcock 
& Wilcox), and Imperial Filature Co. (J. & P. Coats), of English 
capital, and National Cash Register Co. of American capital; and 
there were also Fuji Cotton Spinning Co., Oji Paper Manufacturing Co., 
Japan Nitrogen Co., Japan Musical Instrument Co. (of Sumitomo capital), 
Oriental Linoleum Co. ani others with partially foreign capital. 
These names only are mentioned here, as full details are not known. 
It must be clear how brisk direct investment by foreigners in 
industry was after the World War I from the above descriptions. 
It is noteworthy that joint enterprises with both Japanese and foreign 
capital were as brisk as ever, and powerful plutocratic companies 
joined hands with foreign big concerns. Japanese monopolistic 
enterprises were thus joined with those of foreign nations, and became 
more and more monopolistic by adopting techniques of high standard 
with worldwide patent. Another thing worth noticing was that Japan 
Ford Co., Japan General Motors Co., and some others were of 100 % 
foreign capital, and that Oriental Otis Elevator Co., National Cash 
Register Co. and others had over 50 % foreign capitll, and that the 
number of such companies was increasing. This was nothing but that 
Japan's position became more and more important as a matket and 
as a trade nation of manufactured goods. On the other hand, it 
should be remembered that Japanese cheap labour served under 
those mon)polistic enterprises. It must also be observed that American 
capital has occupied the foremost position in direct investments and in 
the meantime German capital has been conspicuously advancing. 
What ratio, then, did direct investment by foreigners hold in the 
total sum of capital invested in Japmese enterprises? According to 
the Statistics 0/ Factories by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
and from data supplied by the Ministry of Finance, the ratio was 
as follows at the end of 1941: (unit: 1 thousand yen) 
Total sum of Foreign capital 
Japanese firms invested firms 
(B) by (A) 
number of I autfJorized number of I foreign capital 
firms capital (A) firms paied·up (B) 
Industries 39,419 23,511,935 39 103,672 0.61 & Minings 
Trade & 41,479 11,458,117 9 2,258 0.02 Commerce 
According to this table, the ratb was rather small, but if minute· 
Iy considered, while the total capital was authorized one, foreign 
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capital was all paid-up and the investigation referred only to the 
three nations - U. S. A., England and Holland - , and there were, 
besides, branche3 of foreign companies, it is easy to find that the 
ratio of foreign capital actually invested was far greater than that 
in the table. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Outstanding foreign investments in Japan after 1923, continued 
from the table on the p. 42, are as follows: (unit: 1 thousand yen) 
Debentures Direct 
National National (issued Investments Loans (home Local Loans by Foreigners 
year Loans issued) sold (issued abroad) in Japanese Total (issued 
abroad) to Foreigners abroad) Banks & (es tima ted) Companies 
(estimated) 
1923 1,320,614 7,017 130,215 132,941 21,993 1,61.2,780 
1924 1,514,.866 25,955 127,404 193,461 21,993 1,883,078 
1925 1,500,.215 8,713 124,6.87 331,558 21,993 1,987,106 
1926 1,477,869 9,688 820,2.23 347,643 92,133 2,147,547 
1927 1,460,232 14,768 257,640 315,500 97,992 2,146,133 
1928 1,453,093 31,357 . 254,163 470,407 113,828 2,3.2.2,858 
1929 1,446,895 31,779 245,667 465,623 113,828 2,303,792 
1930 1,567,3.85 84,179 .845,174 455,867 113,828 .2,466,372 
1931 1,477,335 59,181 240,697 505,964 113,828 2,397,005 
1932 1,398,297 51,428 235,502 467,821 ? 2,153,048 
1933 1,4.81,211 50,019 230,985 383,117 ? 2,085,331 
When import of foreign capital are compared with those before 
the War, it is found first that national and municipal loans were not 
raised overseas as much as before. There were no foreign loans for 
public enterprises found, except the loans to meet the emergency of 
the Kanto earthquake·fire. This was partly due to the development 
of the domestic capital market, and partly to the government's policy 
against the floatation of public lo,ms abroad, the pCllicy hld begun 
about 1909. However, an en:Jrmous capital fund accumulated under 
favourable conditions of the World War was all consumed so)n 
after the War. So that after such an unprecedented disaster as 
the Kant') earthquake·fire, expenses for the restoration had (0 be 
raised partly abroad, even upCln unfavourable terms. As capital 
remained continuously short both at home and abroad, the Russo-
Japanese War Loan, whose term of redemption was to come in 
1931, had to be converted by another foreign currency loans in 
1930. Generally speaking, terms to issue these foreign loans were 
considered more unfavourable to Japan than previous ones. Though 
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this was due partly to the rigid postwar American and English 
markets, in which it was not easy to raise foreign loans, the main 
re3.son was the insecurity of Japanese financial conditions, which 
was expressed in the failure of currency stabilization. 
The second thing to be mentioned was that the issuance of de· 
bentures in the foreign market, which had started before the War, 
became very frequent after the War. This was because (1) the 
accumulated capital was made very scanty in the post-bellum period, 
especially after the great earthquake-fire, (2) notwithstanding, capital 
of long term and low rate of interest was demanded for electric 
resources to be developed, (3) it was necessary to fill specie abroad, 
and (4) international credit for Japanese big companies became 
strong. Thus, especially, the great development of electric resources 
about 1926 was made by the aid of foreign capital. There were, 
however, some points to which attention was to be paid. One of 
them was that the supremacy of the big five electric companies was 
established by foreign capital, and another was that foreign loans, as 
those of the Oriental Development Co., the South Manchurian Railway 
Co., and the Formosan Electric Co., were raised for the economic 
development overseas. This second point meant that Japan's overseas 
economic expansion was guaranteed by foreign capital. Referring 
to the South Manchurian Railway Co. debentures, the government 
succeeded to the old ones in 1920, and in 1933 to those issued in 
1923, and appropriated them to the capital to be paid-up. This 
showed that the company and the national capital were b3.nded 
together. 
In short, national and municipal loans abroad decreased and 
external debentures increased rapidly in place of the former. By 
this fact we mean nothing but the alternation of issuers as a result 
of the strong development of capitalistic economy; and no change 
could be seen so far as Japan's constant need for foreign capital 
was concerned, for the development of h.er domestic economy, for 
the overseas economic development, and for the maintenance of 
national confidence by the supplement of funds abroad. Thus till 
1931, foreign loans were raised. But the world panic in 1929, the 
serious depression which followed the removal of the embargo on 
the exportation of gold in 1930, the aggravation of international 
relations following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, 
the rep!acing of the embargo on the exportation of gold in the same 
year, and the subsequent heavy fall of exchange rate; they all 
made it difficult to raise new loans, and means to refund such 
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foreign loans as electric company debentures W0re to be adopted. 
Thirdly: direct investments in Japanese industries by foreigners 
became more and more brisk, and even after 1932, when no foreign 
loans were issued, new investments were continuously made. It was 
during the World War I that Japan could restore her commercial 
right at one stroke, which had been held long in the hands of for-
eign merchants since the opening of the country at the end of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate. In other words, the exceedingly rapid develop-
ment of Japanese manufacturing industries, the wonderful growth 
of her shipping companies and commercial concerns made foreign 
trade companies go out of Japan_ Foreign investments in Japanese 
manufacturing industries, however, became more and more active_ 
This was due to the following reasons: that world-wide monopolistic 
capitalism developed more and more strongly, that international capi-
talistic competition became active, that cooperation of international 
capital was desired both at home and overseas, as a result of the 
progress of monopolization of big enterprises in Japan, too, that 
Japan's position as a trade nation of manufactured goods became 
more and more important, and that much was to be desired in 
Japanese technical standards compared with that of the world at large. 
The spheres of industry in which foreign capital was invested, 
comprised electric instruments manufacturing industry, as chief and 
important as ever since the prewar period, oil refining industry, 
plate-glass manufactUring industry, and various others. It was also 
noteworthy that, as after the Russo-Japanese War, techniques of the 
world standard were introduced together with capital. What was 
more important was that direct investments took generally the form 
of joint enterprise, so that through Japanese enterprises, foreigners 
had much voice in their management and shared responsibility of risks, 
and that companies of 100% foreign capital, such as Japan Ford, Japan 
General Motors, Rising Sun Oil, Japan Vacuum Oil, were establi3hed. 
Consequently international relations between capital and labour -
such as joint domestic and foreign capital versus Japanese labour, 
foreign capital versus Japanese capital and labour-were made up. 
Fourth: Among indirect investments (foreign loans and deben-
tures) as well as among direct ones, English and American capital 
occupied overwhelming pOSition as in the prewar period. How-
ever, as electric company debentures were generally of American 
money, and companies of American capital surpassed those of other 
nations', the dominant position of America as an investor nation 
toward Japan became unshakable. This was due to the fact that 
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America became the sole export nation of capital after the World 
War, the centre of international finance moved from London to 
New York, and that there was much to be learned technically in 
America. It was to be remembered, too, that German capital 
was also becoming very influential in direct investments. 
Fifth: Without distinction of indirect or direct investments, almost 
aU enterprises which received foreign capital were those of the 
plutocrats. The Industrial Bank of Japan dealt chiefly in foreign 
loans generally, but after the World War the Mitsui Bank appeared 
as a powerful trustee. In agreement with this, foreign underwriters 
of loans were powerful, and those companies which directly 
invested in industries were first-rate makers or monopolistic enter-
prisers. This showed that Japan had already advanced to a stage 
of monopolistic capitalism, and that Japanese monopolistic enterprises 
had become a member of international business combinations. 
Accordingly, though the ratio of foreign capital in the total sum 
of industrial capital in Japan was very small, its importance could 
never be underestimated. 
Thus the monopolistic stage of capitalism in Japan was one in 
which foreign capital flowed abundantly to Japan in the form of 
debentures and direct investments in enterprises. The importation 
of capital, national and municipal loans being put together, exceeded 
the exportation of it. Japan which became a creditor nation with an 
excess of over 1,370 million yen at one time by the World War I, 
turned out again to be a debtor nation, with debts excess amounting 
to about 800 million yen, during the ten years up to the world crisis 
in 1929. During the time, however, production technique, especially in 
the fields of both chemical and heavy industries, made remarkable 
progress, industrial productive power increased as a whole, and 
capital was accumulated, with the result that the foundation of 
Japanese capitalism became very strong. And the capital thus 
accumulated became the chief motive power of her imperialistic 
expansion to Manchuria and China Proper. 
